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Abstract 
This paper discusses the structural changes in Russian employment and explores 
whether the evolution of employment from 2000 to 2012 followed the scenario of pro-
gressive upgrading in job quality or brought about the polarization of jobs in terms of 
quality. Jobs are defined in this study as occupation-industry cells, and their quality is 
measured through relative earnings and education level. Using detailed micro-data from 
a few complementary large-scale surveys, we rank all jobs according to the earnings and 
educational criteria and divide these distributions into five quintiles. At the next stage, we 
explore dynamic changes in job quality and socio-demographic characteristics of workers 
in different quintiles. The paper rejects the polarization scenario and confirms the upgrad-
ing hypothesis.
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1. Introduction
The idea of this paper follows a well-known debate in the economic literature. 
We look at the structural changes in Russian employment and attempt to answer 
a simple but important question. Did evolution of employment from 2000 to 2012 
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follow the scenario of progressive upgrading or did it bring about the polarization 
of jobs in terms of quality? The first option, upgrading, assumes the reallocation 
of workers from low-quality towards better or high-quality jobs. The expected 
outcome here is that over time, the demand for high-skilled and well-paid “good” 
jobs relative to low-skilled and poorly paid “bad” jobs tends to increase. This 
scenario is often associated with the skills biased technological change (SBTC) 
hypothesis (Katz and Murphy, 1992). The alternative scenario expects a U-type 
employment change when both “bad” and “good” jobs demonstrate a relative 
rise (in terms of employment) against the downsizing of medium-quality em-
ployment. This case suggests the polarization of employment when both tails 
in the job quality distribution rise and the middling part of the distribution falls 
(Autor et al., 2003; Goos and Manning, 2007; Goos et al., 2009; Fernández-
Macías et al., 2012). The underlying reason for such development is that mid-
dling jobs assume usually mostly routine and repetitive tasks that can be easily 
computerized; therefore, these jobs are outsourced. This scenario can be referred 
to as a routine biased technological change (RBTC). Both hypotheses explain 
changes in employment through the impact of technology (via skills) but identify 
signs and affected zones differently.
Our paper makes the first attempt to look at changes in Russian employment 
through the prism of the SBTC versus the RBTC hypothesis. There are a few 
reasons why the Russian case is of interest. First, the Russian economy is quite 
large, and this is enough in itself to attract research interest. Second, in the 2000s, 
the Russian economy experienced rapid economic growth when the GDP almost 
doubled, and this was associated with a rapid rise in real earnings. Third, this 
growth was commodity export-led, which could have an ambiguous impact on 
various parts of job quality distribution. Fourth, the economic structure experien-
ced a deep transformation marked by a rapid contraction in agricultural and man-
ufacturing employment and simultaneous growth in the service sector. Fifth and 
finally, this was a period of explosive expansion of tertiary education. Though all 
of these changes in general were far from being unique to one country, they were 
of impressive speed and magnitude and were all concentrated in a relatively short 
time interval. Some changes can be considered to be components of the SBTC, 
while others indicate the RBTC scenario. This ambiguity makes empirical testing 
even more interesting.
The issue of changing jobs relates to an ongoing discussion regarding the fate 
of the middle class. The polarization scenario assumes that job distribution hol-
lows out in the middle. Employment tends to concentrate closer to the poles, 
while medium-quality jobs contract. If we consider a large middle class as 
a foundation for social and political stability, polarization brings obvious risks. In 
Russia, the discussion concerning the evolution of the middle class is also popu-
lar and concerns its criteria, scale, composition, and so on. Without delving into 
the debate, we may note here that looking at this issue through the prism of job 
structure has an advantage in that it does not rely on the characteristics of par-
ticular individuals. 
The link between this discussion and our findings depends on where (or into 
which job cells) we place the prospective members of the middle class. To this 
extent, the latter can be associated with the central part of the job quality distribu-
tion, and we can say that in Russia in 2000–2012, the middle class did not shrink, 
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and its fraction remained stable. Moreover, the contraction of groups located in 
the lower part of the distribution and the expansion of those located in the upper 
part were quite visible. This process was not associated with the divergence of 
the job structure towards the poles, and there was little evidence for increasing 
risks of instability. Assuming that the Russian middle class occupies not mid-
dling jobs but those above the middle, we can suggest its expansion. In any case, 
the social structure became more, not less, robust.
The empirical approach taken in this study follows the general methodology 
suggested in (Fernández-Macías, 2012; Fernández-Macías et al., 2012). The key 
conceptual issue concerns “job” and “job quality” definitions. Jobs are defined 
as occupation-industry cells, and their quality is measured through relative earn-
ings and education levels. At the first stage of the study, using detailed micro-data 
from a few complementary large-scale surveys, we rank all jobs according to earn-
ings and educational criteria and divide these distributions into 5 quintiles, where 
the first quintile represents the lowest-quality jobs, while the fifth quintile repre-
sents the highest-quality jobs. At the second stage, we explore dynamic changes in 
job quality and socio-demographic characteristics of workers in different quintiles.
The paper consists of 6 sections, an introduction and a conclusion. Section 
2 gives an overview of how the Russian labor market evolved over the period 
under study and its major institutional properties. Section 3 presents the major 
data sources used in the study and the construction of key variables. Section 4 
discusses the general evolution of the job structure and major characteristics 
of “good” and “bad” jobs. Section 5 looks at job quintiles through the lens of 
 sectoral decompositions. Section 6 introduces social and demographic profiling 
of quintiles. Section 7 evaluates the robustness of our main results. In the con-
cluding section, we discuss the main findings, as well as caveats and constraints 
related to the study. 
2. Labor market developments1 
The period under study was characterized by remarkable heterogeneity and 
macroeconomic volatility. Russia experienced a few drastic macroeconomic 
shocks in the 1990s–2000s. The years of 1992, 1994, 1998, and 2009 were 
marked by large output falls. The transformational recession in the 1990s was 
accompanied by a 40% cumulative decline in GDP between 1991 and 1998. 
However, this “great contraction” in output was associated with a much milder 
employment reduction that was less than 15% total within the period. In other 
words, on average, each percentage point of GDP reduction caused an employ-
ment decline of only 0.3–0.35 percentage points. This contrasted strongly with 
initial expectations and actual employment evolution in most Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) countries, where the elasticity was close to 1. 
The year of 1999 became the first in the decade-long economic recovery that 
was boosted initially by the deep devaluation of the national currency and sup-
ported later by the rise in world oil and commodity prices. By 2008, the Russian 
GDP was almost 95% higher than in 1998. As a result, these ten consecutive 
years of the economic boom positively affected all major labor market indicators. 
 1 A detailed account of these developments is given in (Gimpelson and Kapeliushnikov, 2013).
195V. Gimpelson, R. Kapeliushnikov / Russian Journal of Economics 2 (2016) 192−218
Employment levels rose, while the unemployment rate decreased from an all-
time record high of 14.6% (in early 1999) to a quite modest 6.2% in 2008. 
The next strong negative hit arrived with the global crisis in 2008-09. It de-
creased the GDP by nearly 8% (y-o-y) in 2009 and halted the expansion of em-
ployment. As an outcome of the crisis, unemployment increased again but only 
modestly and for a relatively short period. Though the post-crisis (2010–2012) 
period was characterized by the dampened growth, the employment-to-popula-
tion ratio stayed high, while the unemployment rate remained low. Two major 
factors were at work here. On the one hand, ongoing demographic change 
associa ted with aging and educational upgrading of the population led to lower-
ing of the natural rate of unemployment; on the other hand, low wage floors may 
have contributed to keeping the labor force in employment.
The comparison of major employment indicators in the years 2000 and 2012 
will be given in more detail in Section 4 of the paper. This evolution was accom-
panied by major improvements in aggregate outcomes in terms of wages and use 
of skills. One can say that powerful tide of petrodollars lifted all boats, shifting 
Russia closer to the group of high-income countries. The skill composition of 
jobs was not stagnant either. The fraction of employees with tertiary education 
increased from around 1/5 in 2000 to over 30% in 2012. This made Russia one of 
the world leaders in terms of formal education of the labor force (though saying 
little about the quality of the education).
Persistence of high employment and low unemployment rates might cause an 
illusion of relative stability and hide important changes in the composition of em-
ployment. Two employment dimensions are salient in the given context. The first 
is the sectoral composition of workforce, and the second is the occupational one. 
Available data supports the hypothesis that the economy has experienced a non-
trivial sectoral reallocation of labor, and because occupational mixes vary across in-
dustries, we can expect to see large cross-occupational reallocation as well. Goods-
producing occupations lost workers, while trade and services related occupations 
expanded their shares (we discuss these trends in more detail later). The sub-
period of 2000–2008 was marked by a more intensive employment reshuffle than 
the second subperiod of 2008–2012. Though we have no fully comparable Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) data for the pre-2000 period, there is strong evidence that real-
location across occupations then was even more intensive (Sabirianova, 2002).
These observations outline the general context for job reallocation in Russia 
over 2000–2012 and suggest that its speed and scale are likely to be significant, 
though its particular patterns are not a priori clear. 
3. Data and empirical methodology
The main source of data on jobs exploited in the paper is the Labour Force 
Survey (called in Russia the Population Survey on Employment Issues) adminis-
tered by the official statistical agency (Rosstat). In 1992–1998, the survey was 
conducted annually; from 1999 to August 2009, quarterly; and afterwards, month-
ly. It samples the adult population aged 15–72 in all Russian regions. The annual 
number of observations equaled 540 thousand in the initial period, 270–300 thou-
sand in 1997–2008, and was finally increased to approximately 800 thousand in 
September 2009 and onwards. The LFS is routinely used to estimate employment 
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and unemployment within the ILO-defined framework and is the basic source to 
construct data series on occupations. 
Our analysis focuses on the period of 2000–2012. Throughout most of 
the 1990s, Rosstat used “Soviet-type” occupational and industrial classifica-
tions that were not ISCO and ISIC/NACE compatible.2 In addition, shifting from 
the annual to the quarterly survey regime (in 1999), Rosstat introduced multiple 
methodological innovations that inhibited comparability over time. The year of 
1999 was not only the first when the new methodology (including the sampling 
frame) was applied but was the first post-crisis year as well. To minimize mismea-
surements caused by this volatility, we fix the year of 2000 as the base and divide 
the total period into two subperiods of 2000–2008 and of 2008–2012. The year 
of 2008 marked the borderline between the economic boom observed in the first 
subperiod and the new crisis/post-crisis subperiod. For the chosen period, the oc-
cupational (OKZ) and industrial (OKVED) classifications applied by Rosstat are 
fully harmonized with standards of ISCO-88 and ISIC, correspondingly. 
For our analysis, we combine 2-digit coding of occupations (that gives 33 oc-
cupational groups) with 1-digit industries (17 industries). For the manufacturing 
sector, however, we use 2-digit coding, which adds 14 industries. This level of 
disaggregation provides us with 990 (33×30) cells, of which 635 are not empty. 
The LFS as the data source is far from the ideal. Its main drawback is its lack of 
earnings data necessary for ranking selected job cells by earnings-based quality. 
To overcome this constraint, we apply two alternative approaches to ranking jobs. 
The first approach measures job quality using educational information from 
the LFS. It assumes that the educational credentials of workers in an occupation-
industry defined cell characterize the quality of this job. We call it educational 
or education-based criterion. The information on educational levels achieved by 
respondents contained in the LFS can be converted into estimates of the duration 
of schooling.3 For robustness, we use two education-based rankings accounting 
for average duration of schooling by occupation-industry cells at the beginning 
(2000) and end (2012) of the period.
The second and main approach is earnings-based. We reconstruct earnings 
for each occupation-industry cell using alternative data sources and then impute 
them to particular LFS-based job cells. 
Most earnings-related information comes from another Rosstat-administered 
source called the Survey on Earnings by Occupations (SEO and abbreviated in 
Russian as OZPP). It is conducted bi-annually in October and contains earn-
ings data for approximately 750 thousand workers living in all Russian regions. 
Unfortunately, it provides only a partial solution to the earnings data problem, 
and we use an additional data set to remedy it (see Appendix). 
The SEO contains various wage-setting characteristics. It records total month-
ly earnings, hours actually worked, and data on wage composition. The latter 
 2 ISIC represents the International Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities, and ISCO 
represents the International Standard Classification of Occupations. These standards are suggested by the UN 
Statistical Division for use in all countries. 
 3 We measure the duration converting levels of education attained (in the Russian classification) into years 
of schooling using the following converter: lower than basic secondary — 6 years, incomplete secondary — 9, 
complete secondary — 11, vocational — 12, technical college — 13, incomplete higher — 14, higher — 16, and 
postgraduate — 19 years. 
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includes three components: the basic and fixed in contracts part of earnings (we 
call it the “basic or tariff-based part”), the variable part in the form of various 
premiums and bonuses (not rigidly fixed in individual labor contracts), and (so-
called Northern) regional increments. We controlled for robustness of the job 
ranking estimates using not only average monthly earnings but also basic wage 
(without premiums and bonuses) and mean hourly wage. 
The selected criteria are consistent. As Table 1 reports, the education-based 
rankings are strongly intercorrelated (nearly 0.8). Inter alia, this consistency 
of job-education/skill hierarchies over time suggests that job rankings did 
not change significantly during the period under consideration. Alternative 
earnings- based measures display an even higher degree of association (with 
correlations of the order of 0.90–0.99). However, education- and earnings-
based job quality measures have somewhat weaker correlations (approximately 
0.45–0.5). Consequently, all educational measures and earnings measures are 
mutual substitutes, though education-based and earnings-based rankings can 
potentially diverge. 
Tables 2–4 present estimates of earnings and educational attainment across ag-
gregated industries and occupations. All rankings considered here remain stable 
over time, thus allowing the assumption that the same (or a similar) distribution 
could be observed at the beginning of the period in 2000 (for which comparable 
earnings data does not exist). High correlations (0.7–0.8) between relative earn-
ings by occupations for different years (2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011) support this 
assumption. 
Let us summarize this section. We classify all LFS respondents along the oc-
cupation-industry dimension and call these cells “jobs”. Then, we introduce 
5 alterna tive job quality measures, of which 2 are education-based and 3 are 
earnings-based, and use them to rank all job cells in 2000 by quintiles (with 
the “worst” jobs belonging to the first quintile). These quintiles are made of 
Table 1
Correlation matrix for 5 alternative measures of job quality (N = 635). 
Measure-1 
(mean years 
of schooling 
in 2000,  
LFS)
Measure-2 
(mean years 
of schooling 
in 2012,  
LFS)
Measure-3 
(average 
monthly wage 
in 2007, 
OZPP)
Measure-4 
(mean  
basic wage 
in 2007, 
OZPP)
Measure-5 
(mean  
hourly wage 
in 2007, 
OZPP)
Measure-1 (mean 
years of schooling 
in 2000, LFS)
1 0.783 0.434 0.520 0.459
Measure-2 (mean 
years of schooling 
in 2012, LFS)
0.783 1 0.428 0.491 0.455
Measure-3 (average 
monthly wage 
in 2007, OZPP)
0.434 0.428 1 0.894 0.990
Measure-4 (mean 
basic wage 
in 2007, OZPP)
0.520 0.491 0.894 1 0.899
Measure-5 (mean 
hourly wage 
in 2007, OZPP)
0.459 0.455 0.990 0.899 1
Note: All coefficients are significant at 1% (2-tailed).
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the ranked jobs weighted by employment in those jobs so that each quintile re-
presents 20% of employment in the starting period. Then, we explore what hap-
pens with employment in each of the quintiles over the period 2000–2012 as well 
as across two subperiods (before and after the crisis) within the whole period. 
Now, we are well equipped to address the question as to where jobs were created 
and where they were destroyed. 
Table 2
Educational attainment and average monthly wages by sector, 2000–2012.
Sectors Mean years of schoolinga Average monthly wages, 
thousand rublesb
2000 2008 2012 2000 2008 2012
Agriculture 10.9 11.5 11.7 1.0 8.5 14.1
Fishing 12.2 12.2 12.4 2.8 19.5 29.2
Mining and quarrying 12.6 12.8 12.9 5.9 33.2 50.4
Manufacturing 12.5 12.7 12.9 2.4 16.1 24.5
Electricity, gas and water supply 12.7 12.9 13.1 3.2 19.1 29.4
Construction 12.5 12.6 12.7 2.6 18.6 26.0
Wholesale and retail trade 12.7 12.8 12.9 1.6 14.9 21.6
Hotels and restaurants 12.2 12.4 12.5 1.6 11.5 16.6
Transport and communications 12.4 12.6 12.7 3.2 20.8 31.4
Financial intermediation 14.2 14.8 14.9 5.2 41.9 59.0
Real estate 14.2 13.8 14.0 2.5 21.3 30.9
Public administration 13.4 13.9 14.1 2.7 21.3 35.7
Education 13.9 14.1 14.1 1.2 11.3 19.0
Health and social work 13.1 13.5 13.6 1.3 13.0 20.6
Other service activities 12.6 13.1 13.2 1.5 13.5 21.0
Private households 11.2 11.4 11.6 – – –
Extra-territorial organizations 12.4 14.4 14.6 – – –
Total 12.6 13.0 13.2 2.2 17.3 26.6
Sources: a The LFS-based estimates; b Rosstat. 
Table 3
Educational attainment by occupation, 2000–2012.
Sectors Mean years of schooling
2000 2008 2012
Agriculture 10.9 11.5 11.7
Fishing 12.2 12.2 12.4
Mining and quarrying 12.6 12.8 12.9
Manufacturing 12.5 12.7 12.9
Electricity, gas and water supply 12.7 12.9 13.1
Construction 12.5 12.6 12.7
Wholesale and retail trade 12.7 12.8 12.9
Hotels and restaurants 12.2 12.4 12.5
Transport and communications 12.4 12.6 12.7
Financial intermediation 14.2 14.8 14.9
Real estate 14.2 13.8 14.0
Public administration 13.4 13.9 14.1
Education 13.9 14.1 14.1
Health and social work 13.1 13.5 13.6
Other service activities 12.6 13.1 13.2
Private households 11.2 11.4 11.6
Extra-territorial organizations 12.4 14.4 14.6
Total 12.6 13.0 13.2
Source: LFS.
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The pattern when jobs are generated in the upper and the bottom quintiles 
while the middling quintiles tend to downsize can be a visible manifestation of 
job polarization. Expansion of the upper quintile with simultaneously shrinkage 
of the bottom quintile would signal the scenario of progressive job upgrading. Of 
course, scenarios of more complex and controversial evolution are not excluded 
either. One scenario occurs when different segments of the economy produce dif-
ferent job change patterns. To better understand potential heterogeneity in evolu-
tion of job structures, we look also at particular demographic, occupational and 
industry-specific segments. 
4. General evolution 
Tables 5 and 6 present the evolution of employment by aggregate occupations 
and industries in 2000–2012.
Table 4
Average monthly wages by occupation, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 (thousand rubles).
Occupations 2005 2007 2009 2011
Legislators, senior officials and managers 15.2 24.1 33.5 41.6
Professionals 9.4 14.8 20.1 25.0
Technicians and associate professionals 7.2 11.4 15.1 19.0
Clerks 5.7 8.8 12.2 14.8
Service workers 5.7 8.9 12.0 14.6
Skilled agricultural workers 6.5 10.2 18.0 16.1
Craft workers 9.4 14.6 18.7 23.1
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 10.0 14.8 8.4 23.5
Elementary occupations 3.9 6.2 14.6 10.5
Total 8.7 13.6 18.1 22.7
Source: The OZPP-based estimates.
Table 5
Composition of the employed population aged 15–72 by sector, 2000–2012 (%).
Sectors 2000 2008 2012 Change  
2000–2012 (pp.)
Agriculture 14.2 8.4 7.2 –7.0
Fishing 0.3 0.2 0.2 –0.1
Mining and quarrying 2.0 1.9 2.0 0.0
Manufacturing 19.5 16.4 15.0 –4.5
Electricity, gas and water supply 2.7 3.0 3.3 0.6
Construction 5.1 7.6 7.4 2.3
Wholesale and retail trade 12.3 15.2 16.1 3.8
Hotels and restaurants 1.4 2.1 2.1 0.7
Transport and communications 8.4 9.2 9.4 1.0
Financial intermediation 1.3 1.9 2.0 0.7
Real estate 3.3 6.3 6.6 3.3
Public administration 7.4 7.6 7.5 0.1
Education 9.1 9.1 9.2 0.1
Health and social work 6.7 7.4 8.0 1.3
Other service activities 6.2 3.6 3.8 –2.4
Private households 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Extra-territorial organizations 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 100 100 100    –
Source: The LFS-based estimates.
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Main employment losses were recorded in “A: Agriculture” (–7   pp), “D: Manu-
facturing” (–4.5 pp) and “O: Other community, social and personal service ac-
tivities” (–2.6 pp), while major gains were concentrated in “G: Wholesale and 
retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household 
goods” (+3.8 pp), “K: Real estate, renting and business activities” (+3.3 pp) and 
“F: Construction” (+2.3 pp).4 Industries that shed employment include those with 
low-educated and low-paid labor (A and O) as well as those with high-skilled and 
well-paid labor (D). Employment gains also affect industries with contrasting 
levels of education and pay. 
Changes in occupational composition are also not straightforward. The most 
high-skilled and best-paid occupations are concentrated in ISCO groups 1 and 2, 
which gained 3.9 pp (ISCO1: Managers) and 3.8 pp (ISCO2: Professionals). 
However, the least-skilled and lowest-paid occupations experienced significant 
employment losses (the ISCO 9 group of unskilled workers decreased by 3.1 pp 
and group 6 of agricultural workers by 2.9 pp). At the same time, the occupational 
group of semiskilled workers (ISCO 8) with relatively “good” characteristics 
shrank by 2.9 pp, while the group of trade workers (ISCO 5) with relatively “bad” 
characteristics gained 2.8 pp. 
Though the question on the prevailing direction of structural change remains 
open so far, we observe a massive reallocation. Given impressive economic growth 
and a significant increase in real wages during the period under study, one can ex-
pect that the reallocation was job quality enhancing. This means that the fraction 
of “bad” jobs falls, while in contrast, the fraction of “good” jobs rises.
We start our analysis by applying educational criteria to generate job quality 
rankings. 
As Fig. 1a suggests, the annual outflow from the lowest quintile (containing 
the “worst” jobs) included almost 350 thousand workers. Meanwhile, the in-
flow into the upper quintile was even larger and made approximately 570 thou-
sand. Three middling quintiles were also net recipients, though to a lesser 
degree (with the annual net gain of 35–150 thousand). In the pre-crisis sub-
period (2000–2008), the outflow from the lowest quintile and the inflow into 
 4 Capital letters attached to the titles of economic activities are standard ISIC codes. 
Table 6
Composition of the employed population aged 15–72 by occupation, 2000–2012 (%).
Occupations 2000 2008 2012 Change  
2000–2012 (pp.)
Legislators, senior officials and managers 4.4 7.0 8.3 3.9
Professionals 15.6 18.5 19.4 3.8
Technicians and associate professionals 15.2 15.2 15.1 –0.1
Clerks 3.4 2.9 2.8 –0.6
Service workers 11.8 13.8 14.6 2.8
Skilled agricultural workers 6.3 4.1 3.4 –2.9
Craft workers 16.3 14.8 13.4 –2.9
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 13.5 12.5 12.5 –1.0
Elementary occupations 13.5 11.2 10.4 –3.1
Total 100 100 100    –
Source: OZPP.
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the upper one were 1.5–2 times greater than in the second post-crisis subperiod 
(2008–2012). Therefore, high growth rates were associated with the accelera-
tion of economic restructuring, while the crisis events of 2008–2009 caused 
the deceleration. However, although annual net employment gain decreased 
from 720 thousand over the first subperiod to 230 thousand over the second, 
the direction of reallocation did not change: “bad” jobs were destroyed while 
“good” ones were created. 
Fig. 2a uses relative measures for painting the same reallocation picture. As 
we can see, all changes affected the extreme quintiles, while the middling part 
remained quite stable. In 2012, as in 2000, each of the three middling quintiles 
accumulated approximately 20% of the total employment. Changes at the either 
end of the distribution were impressive. The “bad” jobs segment shrank (in em-
ployment) by 8 pp, while the “good” jobs fraction expanded by 8 pp. Changes 
Fig. 1. Absolute annual average changes in the number of workers per job quintiles,  
2000–2012, total economy (thousand persons).
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that we observe appear to be quality enhancing without any visible symptoms of 
polarization.5
The analytical methodology applied above assumes that ranking of relative 
job quality (in this case, based on the duration of schooling averaged by job cells) 
seems to be stable over time. If a job was “bad” in 2000, in 2012, it remains as 
“bad”, as it was before. The same is also true in relation to “good” jobs. In other 
words, the relative quality of jobs in the ranking is fixed. Of course, this is our 
assumption because the relative quality of jobs may change over time driven by 
 5 The EU-based studies suggest that there are differences in the observed patterns of employment contingent 
upon what type of rating is applied. Education-based rankings are more likely to indicate monotonic upgrading, 
while wage-based rankings are more likely to indicate mixed upgrading/polarisation pattern (Fernández-Macías 
et al., 2012).
Fig. 2. Changes in job structure by quintiles, 2000–2012 (percentage points).
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various factors. If the educational content of some job cells shifts (for example, 
technology makes particular occupations more/less educationally requiring and 
intensive), relative rankings are likely to shift as well. 
To test whether this ranking is inter-temporarily robust, we re-estimate it 
(the duration of schooling as the quality criteria) with 2012 as the base year. 
Expectedly, the results are almost identical given the high correlation between 
these two rankings. Fig. 1b documents that absolute increases by quintiles are 
similar to what we observed using the 2000-based ranking. Structural reallo-
cation was extremely intensive before the 2008–2009 crisis but slowed down 
 afterwards. Again, all changes (with opposite signs but of similar magnitude) 
were concentrated in the extreme quintiles, while the middling quintiles remained 
stable (Fig. 2b). 
Surprisingly, moving to wage-based rankings, we obtain similar results 
(Figs. 1c–1e). The bottom quintile lost approximately 320–340 thousand per 
annum , while the upper quintile gained on the order of 550–680 thousand. 
These estimates are close to those presented earlier in both absolute and relative 
terms. The bottom segment lost 7–8 pp, the upper segment gained 8–10 pp, and 
the middle segments changed little (Figs. 2c–2e).
Summing up these exercises, one can suggest that, in the 2000s, the Russian 
economic growth was job quality enhancing. “Bad” jobs (given the selected cri-
teria) were progressively destroyed, and “good” jobs were created instead.
5. Sectoral dimensions
While the economy at large shifts from “bad” to “better” jobs, some segments 
may move in the opposite direction. Presenting the anatomy of changes in the job 
structure, for the sake of brevity, we rely on the 2007 wage-based rankings. 
However, we will refer to the 2000 education-based rankings as well when these 
criteria bring widely diverting outcomes. 
Gender. Fig. 3a presents average absolute employment increases for men 
by job rating quintiles. On average, during 2000–2012, the number of men in 
the earnings- defined bottom quintile decreased by 206 thousand annually. 
Meanwhile, the upper quintile gained 382 thousand per annum. The third and 
fourth quintiles grew as well, though at a very slow rate, while the second quintile 
shrank slightly. 
As for women, we also observe a rapid loss of employment in the lowest part 
and gains in the upper part of the distribution (Fig. 3b). Annual average losses at 
the bottom were 114 thousand, and gains on the top were 172 thousand.6
Cumulative losses in relative terms made 4.4 pp for males in the bottom quin-
tile, while the upper quintile added 5.1 pp. (Fig. 4a). Cumulative increases in 
female employment (compared to men) were smaller in the lowest as well as in 
the upper quintiles. In the former, this caused a change of 2.9 pp and in the latter 
 6 The education criterion provides very similar results but with reversed gender asymmetry. If men gained 
relatively more in terms of earnings, women benefited more on the educational scale. This reflects the fact that 
Russian men have a positive gender earnings gap but a negative educational gap. Exactly the same gender 
asymmetry in terms of education is typical for the EU, both at the aggregate level and within most member 
states. However, in EU countries, educational outperformance is observed usually only for young women 
compared to young men, while in Russia it is observed over the entire age scale.
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Fig. 3. Absolute annual average changes in the number of workers per job quintiles by socio-demographic 
groups, 2000–2012 (thousand persons; job ranking — by average monthly wage in 2007)
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a change of –2.3 pp. In other words, the contribution of men into job reallocation 
exceeds that of women by two times.7
Age. Figs. 3c–3e provide estimates for three age groups: youth (15–29 years old), 
prime age (30–49) and older ages (50–72). 
Estimates for youth vary markedly across two subperiods (Fig. 3c). The dif-
ferences are partially explained by deep demographic changes caused by reduced 
birth rates in the 1990s. In the first (pre-crisis) subperiod, the total number of youth 
employed grew by approximately 250 thousand per year. In the second (post- 
crisis) subperiod, this age group shrank even faster (on average by 262 thousand 
per year). This age-related recomposition could seriously affect reallocation across 
the job quality spectrum. In the first subperiod, the bottom quintile lost approxi-
mately 137 thousand per year, while the top gained 254 thousand. In the second, 
the speed of change decelerated sharply. The bottom kept decreasing, however, in 
a smaller quantity of 90 thousand per year, while the top stopped gaining. 
For the prime age group, no visible difference by subperiods is observed (Fig. 3d). 
(The size of this age group was in stable decline during the whole period .) The bot-
tom quintile lost annually on average 220 thousand prime-age workers , while the top 
enjoyed almost symmetrical gains. The second and third quintiles also experienced 
employment declines, while the fourth quintile stagnated. 
 7 At the same time, the contributions of men and women into the overall recomposition of employment were 
quite similar if the educational scale is applied.
Fig. 4. Changes in job structure by quintiles and socio-demographic characteristics, 2000–2012 
(percentage points; job ranking — by average monthly wage in 2007).
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For older-age workers, the reallocation picture was completely different 
(Fig. 3e). The absolute size of this demographic group kept increasing along 
the whole period, adding over half a million of workers annually. This massive 
inflow affected the entire distribution of jobs. It added almost equally to all quin-
tiles except the bottom quintile. However, even the bottom quintile that accumu-
lated the “worst” jobs showed some signs of growth in the second subperiod. 
These multi-directional changes for different age groups are better understood 
if relative estimates are used (Fig. 4b). We can easily see that the major contribu-
tion into the shrinkage of the bottom quintile comes from prime-age workers . 
They explain two thirds of the total contraction of “bad” jobs. The rest was 
contri buted to by youth, while the older-age group contributed little to this con-
traction. At the same time, all age groups added almost equally to the expansion 
of “good” jobs. The most interesting is, however, what occurred in the middling 
section of the job quality distribution. As Fig. 4b suggests, the outflow of prime 
age and young (though to a lesser extent) workers from three middling quintiles 
was compensated by the inflow of older-age workers. In fact, the latter age group 
saved middling jobs from a deep contraction. 
Occupations. The question we are trying to address here is the following: 
how were particular occupational groups affected by the general trend towards 
“better ” jobs? Did they all fit the trend or, most likely, when some fit the trend, 
did others move in the opposite direction? To answer this, we divided all workers 
into 4 aggre gate occupational groups: high-skilled white collars (ISCO 1–3); 
low-skilled white collars (ISCO 4-5); high-skilled blue collars (ISCO 7–8), and 
low-skilled blue collars (ISCO 6 and 9). Figs. 3f–3i shed some light on this. 
Unsurprisingly, high-skilled white-collar workers are concentrated in the two 
upper quintiles. Their inflow increased by 190 thousand per year in the fourth 
quintile and by 433 thousand in the fifth one (Fig. 3f ). Their numbers in other 
quintiles did not change. This means that the massive inflow of high-skilled white 
collars in 2000–2012 (approximately 625 thousand per annum) was nearly fully 
absorbed by “good” jobs in the upper quintiles with little leakage downward.
Access to jobs looked different (Fig. 3g). Most of low-skilled white collars 
landed in middling jobs, while accession to the upper quintiles was practically 
closed. Changes in the bottom quintile were modest but positive. 
As for high-skilled blue-collar workers, their absolute employment level 
tended to decrease (Fig. 3h). This decrease began after the crisis and was volumi-
nous, with an annual outflow of approximately 170 thousand. However, if the first 
4 quintiles lost high-skilled blue collars (the largest annual outflow of approxi-
mately 100 thousand workers was in the “worst” first quintile), the fifth gained 
approximately 120 thousand per year.
This pattern has a simple explanation. Many Russian high-skilled blue-collar 
workers benefit strongly from additional pecuniary compensations for working 
in hazardous conditions or in unfriendly climate zones (according to Table 4, 
Russian skilled and semiskilled workers earn nearly as much as highly skilled 
professionals). 
Findings for low-skilled blue collars seem to be quite straightforward (Fig. 3i). 
In 2000–2012, this category downsized quickly (at the rate of a quarter of million 
per year) and mostly in the bottom quintile. The other quintiles experienced little 
change. 
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In summary, if the shrinkage of the bottom quintile was driven mostly by out-
flow of blue-collar workers (both low- and high-skilled), the expansion at the top 
was almost exclusively due to the inflow of high-skilled white collars (Fig. 4c). 
Industry-related variations. We begin the overview of sectoral patterns 
by looking at Agriculture (sector A in ISIC). This sector typically comprises 
the least skilled and paid labor (Fig. 5a). The restructuring caused here a rapid 
outflow of workers from the bottom quintile. The annual loss in agriculture 
amounted to over 300 thousand workers in “bad” jobs, and this contraction 
occurred at high speed during both subperiods. Other quintiles remained prac-
tically unaffected. As a result, the agricultural sector (through its contraction) 
made a heavy contribution into improvement of job composition in the econo-
my at large. 
Manufacturing (D) and Construction (F) occupy intermediate positions in 
terms of skill and pay levels. However, changes in their job structures took dif-
ferent directions (Figs. 5b–5c). In construction, job gains were strongly skewed 
Fig. 5. Absolute annual average changes in the number of workers per job quintiles by sectors, 2000–2012, 
(thousand persons; job ranking — by average monthly wage in 2007).
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towards the top quintile, where employment grew persistently, while in the other 
quintiles, it did not. However, the rapid increase in “good” jobs in the pre-crisis 
period turned into a slight decrease after the crisis. 
Manufacturing (unlike Construction) lost jobs monotonically as a conse-
quence of ongoing deindustrialization. These losses were materialized mostly in 
three central quintiles, while the bottom and the top quintiles remained virtua l-
ly stagnant. As a result, the Russian manufacturing experienced a type of “job 
polarization”, though in a weak form without any visible employment growth at 
the tails of job distribution. 
In Market services, we observe slight contraction at the bottom and expansion 
up along the ranking. Higher-quality quintiles tend to expand more (Fig. 5d). 
The second quintile gained 80 thousand employees per year, while the fifth added 
in size approximately 350 thousand.
Non-market services (the public sector made of Education (M) and Health-
care (N) and Public administration (L)) followed another pattern (Fig. 5e), gain-
ing employment in all quintiles, though the top gained less than others. 
Fig. 6 shows relative contributions of different sectors into general change 
in job composition. For convenience, we divide the sector of Market services 
into two subsectors, namely (i) Trade and (ii) Other market services. The shrink-
age of the bottom quintile is largely explained by employment reduction in 
Agr iculture. This explains a 6.5 pp reduction of a total of 7.6 pp. Contributions 
of Manufacturing and Other market services are much more modest (–0.1 pp 
and –0.6 pp, correspondingly). 
Employment in middling jobs was destroyed more actively by Manufacturing, 
while it was created by Market services. As for top quintile jobs, the expansion 
here was due to Other market services (3.7 pp), Public sector (0.4 pp), Construction 
(1.8 pp) and Trade (1.5 pp). The impact of Manufacturing appeared to be slightly 
negative, reflecting the fact that the creation of “good” jobs occurred here much 
slower than in other industries.
Summing up this part of the discussion, we can argue that liquidation of “bad” 
jobs was driven mostly by Agriculture and the expansion of “good” ones, mostly 
by Market services.
Technological advancement. Technological level by industries varies within 
the broad range. Based on R&D expenditures, manufacturing industries can be di-
Fig. 6. Changes in job structure by quintile and sector, 2000–2012 
(percentage points; job ranking — by average monthly wage in 2007).
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vided into high tech, medium-high tech, medium-low tech and low tech.8 Market 
services can be knowledge-intensive (the high tech knowledge-intensive services 
as a special segment can be further singled out) and knowledge-non- intensive.9 
These classifications help better understand whether the ongoing structural 
change is driven by the technological progress or is neutral to it. Related esti-
mates are presented in Figs. 7–8.
The contraction of employment in Manufacturing that we mentioned earlier 
affects all industries regardless of their technological level and is reflected in all 
quality quintiles (Fig. 7). (The only visible exception is the top quintile of low 
tech industries that expanded little from 2000–2012). Major losses were concent-
rated in the middling quintiles of medium tech industries. In other words, posi-
tive structural changes in the job composition that we document here were not 
associated with reallocation of labor from low and medium tech manufacturing 
into high tech. 
A similar story applies to Market services (Fig. 8). In the top quintile, we ob-
serve no growth driven by the expansion of high tech knowledge-intensive ser-
vices, though in other segments of the market services, the number of “good” 
employment positions increased. Less knowledge-intensive services gained an-
nually approximately 250 thousand employees in “good” jobs, while knowledge-
intensive services added 140 thousand.
Therefore, Manufacturing hardly experienced any structural shift towards 
“good” jobs, while in Market services this shift, though present, affected most-
ly less knowledge-intensive industries. As Fig. 7b suggests, the contribution of 
high tech manufacturing into compression of the bottom quintile and expan-
sion of the top quintile was almost negligible. The same can be said about high 
tech knowledge-intensive services (Fig. 8b). Meanwhile, the contribution of 
less knowledge-intensive services into reduction on the bottom and creation on 
the top was considerable.
In summary, for any part of the Russian economy (except manufacturing) we 
have no evidence suggesting polarization or total degradation of job composi-
tion. In most cases, we observe enhancement of the employment structure and, 
in some sectors, expansion in the middle and flattening on the tails. As the main 
provider of middling jobs, manufacturing industries have been replaced by Trade 
 8 High technology manufacturing: man. of office machinery and computers; man. of radio, television 
and communication equipment and apparatus; man. of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches 
and clocks. Medium-high technology manufacturing: man. of chemicals and chemical products; man. of 
machinery and equipment; man. of electrical machinery and apparatus; man. of transport equipment. Low 
and medium-low technology manufacturing: man. of food products, beverages and tobacco; textiles and 
textile products; leather and leather products; wood and wood products; pulp, paper and paper products, 
publishing and printing; man. of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; man. of rubber and 
plastic products; basic metals and fabricated metal products; man. of other nonmetallic mineral products 
(Felix, 2006).
 9 High technology knowledge-intensive services: post and telecommunications; computer and related 
activities; research and development. Knowledge-intensive services: water transport; air transport; post and 
telecommunications; financial intermediation; real estate, renting and business activities; education; health 
and social work; recreational, cultural and sporting activities. Less knowledge-intensive services: hotels and 
restaurants; land transport; transport via pipelines; supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of 
travel agencies; public administration and defense; compulsory social security; sewage and refuse disposal, 
sanitation and similar activities; activities of membership organization n.e.c.; other service activities; activities 
of households as employers of domestic staff; extra-territorial organizations and bodies (Felix, 2006).
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and Other market services sectors. Meanwhile, the impact of technologically ad-
vanced industries in structural changes remained minimal.
6. Demographic profiles of “good” and “bad” quintiles
In this section, we look at the demographic composition of the quality quin-
tiles using a wage-based measure. 
“Bad” jobs from the bottom quintile are largely (by 2/3) populated by women 
(Table 7). This is mirrored at the top. 
Jobs in the first quintile are much more likely to attract young people (younger 
than 20) and those older than 60. Both age groups lag in earnings behind the prime 
age. Other quintiles have little in terms of age specificity. Job quality shows no 
Fig. 7. Manufacturing industries with different technological levels, 2000–2012  
(job ranking — by average monthly wage in 2007).
Fig. 8. Services with different levels of knowledge intensity, 2000–2012  
(job ranking — by average monthly wage in 2007).
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Table 7
Socio-demographic profiles of job quintiles, 2012 (%; ranking by average monthly wage in 2007).
Groups Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Total
By gender
Males 43.6 30.7 39.5 59.8 69.9 51.0
Females 56.4 69.3 60.5 40.2 30.1 49.0
By age
Less than 20 2.5 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.7
20–29 15.5 27.2 22.0 24.3 21.8 22.6
30–39 20.5 26.5 25.9 26.6 27.8 26.0
40–49 23.7 22.9 24.8 23.2 24.8 23.9
50–59 28.2 18.8 22.5 21.6 21.8 22.1
60 and more 9.5 3.4 4.5 4.1 3.6 4.6
By educational attainment
University 6.3 16.4 29.3 37.6 46.7 30.2
Technical college 19.5 31.4 33.0 27.5 19.9 26.2
Vocational (secondary) 23.2 21.6 17.7 19.1 17.9 19.6
Upper secondary 37.8 26.3 17.1 13.9 13.6 20
Lower secondary 11.9 4.1 2.8 1.8 1.8 3.7
Primary 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3
By marriage status
Married 67.2 61.4 66.2 67.9 71.0 67.1
Not married 32.8 38.6 33.8 32.1 29.0 32.9
By residence
Urban 43.2 76.9 77.9 85.3 85.4 76.8
Rural 56.8 23.1 22.1 14.7 14.6 23.2
By tenure
Less than 1 year 15.3 15.0 9.8 9.0 9.7 13.1
1–3 17.1 19.2 13.6 14.2 14.2 15.1
3–5 14.5 15.8 13.4 13.9 13.8 13.9
5–10 22.5 23.8 23.1 25.3 26.7 24.2
More than 10 years 30.6 26.3 40.1 37.6 35.5 33.7
By occupations
Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.3 27.0 8.3
Professionals 0.2 4.0 25.3 27.4 29.0 19.4
Technicians and associate professionals 5.7 21.0 18.8 24.2 5.8 15.2
Clerks 4.3 3.3 6.6 1.7 0.0 2.8
Service workers 12.5 46.4 14.2 5.7 0.4 14.7
Skilled agricultural workers 25.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 3.4
Craft workers 3.6 4.4 12.5 25.4 15.9 13.5
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 10.6 1.4 13.8 10.4 21.9 12.5
Elementary occupations 37.9 19.2 8.4 0.8 0.0 10.4
By sectors
Agriculture 49.2 1.8 0.8 0.0 1.2 7.2
Mining and quarrying 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 6.8 2.0
Manufacturing 0.6 11.2 14.4 30.9 12.5 15.0
Electricity, gas and water supply 1.4 0.9 3.6 7.1 2.9 3.3
Construction 0.0 3.1 2.6 1.5 22.1 7.5
Wholesale and retail trade 0.0 44.8 8.3 13.3 11.0 16.1
Hotels and restaurants 0.0 7.5 0.7 1.8 0.6 2.1
Transport and communications 0.0 2.4 8.9 5.6 22.1 9.4
Financial intermediation 0.0 0.2 1.5 0.3 6.0 2.0
Real estate 4.2 0.5 8.2 6.7 11.0 6.6
Public administration 6.5 8.7 4.1 16.8 2.6 7.6
Education 18.1 15.3 18.4 2.1 0.0 9.3
Health and social work 15.5 1.8 18.5 8.8 0.9 8.0
Other service activities 4.5 1.8 9.9 4.4 0.3 3.8
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association with the marital status of workers. Employment in “bad” jobs is, as 
expected, biased towards rural residents who make up to 60% of the bottom quin-
tile but less than 15% of the upper one.
Higher quintiles have larger fractions of workers with higher education and 
smaller fractions of those with lower education. In the bottom quintile, over 10% 
of workers have an educational attainment less than lower secondary, while in 
the upper quintile, this fraction is under 2%. As for holders of university level 
diplomas, the corresponding shares are 10% and 50%. In general, the higher 
the quintile, the higher the share is of well-educated workers.
The occupational composition also differs markedly across quintiles. The lower 
quintiles attract mostly blue collars, while the upper ones attract mostly white 
collars. The fraction of low-skilled workers in the first quintile is close to 40% 
and in the fifth is almost zero. The fraction of the ISCO 1 group in the first quin-
tile is under 0.5% but accounts for 60% of employment in the upper quintile. 
Half of all “bad” jobs are agricultural, and the contribution of the public sector is 
close to 40%. A few industries (Mining, Transportation, Finance) generate no “bad” 
jobs at all. Among main providers of employment to the “good” — meaning best 
paid — jobs are Construction, Transportation, Manufacturing, Trade and Real estate. 
Findings emerging from the simple bivariate analysis can be supported by 
simple econometrics. We estimate an ordered probit model where the quintile 
distribution of the LFS respondents is on the left-hand side. Correspondingly, 
the dependent variable takes values from 1 to 5 (Table 8). Major individual de-
Table 8
Ordered probit for earnings-based quintiles, coefficients and standard errors (SE).
Coef. SE 
Males 0.717*** 0.003
Age under 20 ref. ref.
Age 20–29 0.521*** 0.017
Age 30–39 0.468*** 0.018
Age 40–49 0.419*** 0.018
Age 50–59 0.358*** 0.018
Age 60 and more 0.057*** 0.019
University 0.927*** 0.005
Technical college 0.406*** 0.004
Vocational 0.211*** 0.005
Upper secondary ref. ref.
Lower secondary –0.290*** 0.008
Primary –0.581*** 0.028
Married 0.020*** 0.003
Urban 0.503*** 0.003
Tenure less than 1 year ref. ref.
Tenure 1–3 years 0.462*** 0.008
Tenure 3–5 0.435*** 0.007
Tenure 5–10 0.489*** 0.007
Tenure 10–20 0.580*** 0.007
Tenure more than 20 years 0.640*** 0.006
Number of obs. 511 573
LR chi2 (18) 151 080.21
Log likelihood –742 073.1
Pseudo R2 0.0924
Note: *** p < 0.01.
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mographic characteristics comprise the right-hand side of the equation. All coef-
ficients are statistically highly significant and have expected signs. 
Compared to women, men are more likely to belong to higher earnings quin-
tiles other things being controlled for. The effect of age is clearly non-linear. 
The strongest positive effect of age on the earnings-based quintiles is in the 20–29 
age group and then dwindles monotonically. However, it remains positive com-
pared to the reference age even in the oldest age group. The outlying position of 
the youngest group is explained by the fact that most of individuals of that age 
tend to continue education and the transition to full-time work happens for them 
later in life. Being married and living in a city enhances the chances of being 
in the higher quintiles. Having a better education and belonging to the first two 
ISCO groups (other things being equal) emerge as strong predictors for being 
paid well. On the contrary, being low-skilled or being an agricultural worker raise 
likelihood of low pay. 
7. How robust are our estimates? 
Though all our exercises provide outcomes in favor of upgrading, not pola-
rization, some doubts still remain. Our conclusions depend on data of less-than-
superior quality. If middling jobs are those for which we rely heavily on wage im-
putations, a high risk of biased estimates cannot be totally excluded. This caveat 
deserves to be addressed explicitly. 
In ranking occupation-industry cells according to the earnings-based criterion, 
we use data covering large and medium-sized firms only (while earnings to un-
observable cells are imputed). The wage ranking here may deviate significantly 
from the wage ranking in the total economy because small firms tend to pay less. 
This is likely in those industries where the fraction of employment outside large 
and medium-sized firms is large (Construction, Trade, etc.). In fact, comparing 
our main wage data source (the SEO) with official aggregate data (where small 
firms are partially accounted for), we see serious deviations in Construction and 
Trade. These two industries have a heavy concentration of small firms. The actual 
deviation can be larger because no official estimates account for informal activity, 
which is even lower paid but is more widespread in the same sectors. Therefore, 
imputing to such workers “invisible” (to the SEO) higher wages, we erroneously 
inflate the upper quintile and can distort the whole distribution. 
First, this objection does not relate to the education-based estimates because 
the level of education is measured properly for all workers. Second, the collapse 
in the lowest quintile seems indisputable. Third and finally, even if Trade and 
Construction are completely excluded, the upper quintile expands by approxi-
mately 4 pp. Therefore, the upgrading scenario holds. 
Another caveat relates to the issue of migrant labor. During the period under 
study, the Russian labor market experienced a large inflow of low productive and 
low educated temporary migrant workers from the CIS countries. Most of them 
land in the least-skilled and poorly paid jobs. The LFS on which our estimates 
are based does not cover migrant workers. If “bad” jobs that become vacant due 
to an outflow of Russian workers are taken by migrants, then our conclusion 
about the drastic contraction of the bottom quintile may be erroneous because it 
is based on statistical mismeasurement. 
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Unfortunately, there is no reliable data on temporary migration to Russia. Most 
of the labor migrants work illegally and informally. A realistic guess for the stock 
estimate would be 4–4.5 million migrant workers or 5.5–6% of the total employ-
ment (close to the official estimates provided by Rosstat) in 2012. If we were to 
take the strong assumption that the number of migrants tripled over 2000–2012 
and that all of them were in the “bad” job quintile, then our estimates of the com-
pression should decline from 7 pp to 3 pp. However, even in this case, our general 
conclusion remains valid. 
8. Conclusions
This paper investigates changes in the composition of jobs in the Russian 
economy for the period of 2000–2012. Using five alternative criteria of job 
quality (two are education-based and three are earnings-based), we find out that 
during the period under study, the job structure did not demonstrate any signs 
of polarization. The ongoing structural change could be characterized as a pro-
gressive upgrading when the fraction of “bad” jobs decreased, while the frac-
tion of “good” jobs tended to increase. This conclusion holds for the both 
subperiods, though the rate of change decelerated in the second one. In rela-
tive terms, the cumulative compression of the bottom quintile equaled 7–8 pp 
against the expansion on top by 8–10 pp. In the middling part of the ranking 
scale, the changes were minor. These findings are robust to any of the quality 
criteria applied. 
According to the education-based criterion, the contraction in the bottom and 
expansion in the top quintiles were accounted for equally by male and female 
employment. However, according to the earnings-based criterion, the contribu-
tion of male employment is twice as large as that of women. Representation 
of prime-age workers in the bottom quintile dwindled, and in the top quintile, 
it rose more sharply than in other age groups. The contribution of youth and 
the older group into structural job change was also significant but was smaller in 
size than that of the prime-age group. As for the occupational characteristics of 
workers, the compression at the bottom was accounted for largely by blue-collar 
workers, and the expansion at the top was mainly attributable to high-skilled 
white-collar workers.
Shrinking agricultural employment is the major industry-level reason for 
the reduction in “bad” jobs. Industry-level drivers for the expansion of “good” 
jobs were Market services and Construction. Surprisingly or not, under these 
conditions, deindustrialization of the Russian economy (as significant contrac-
tion in the manufacturing employment) had little effect on the aggregate job 
quality distribution. Manufacturing lost employment predominantly in the three 
middling quintiles. As a result, it was the only sector where something such as 
“job polarization” was observed. Finally, the contribution of high tech manu-
facturing and services was small because their fraction in total employment re-
mained negligible. 
We estimate the incidence of “bad” and “good” jobs for workers belonging 
to different social and demographic groups. If the quality of jobs is ranked by 
the earnings-based criterion, then men, older, educated, married, urban resi-
dents, managers, professionals and skilled workers employed in mining, con-
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struction, finance, transportation and communications have better chances to 
secure “good” jobs.
The key conceptual issue is how the Russian economy has managed to avoid 
the polarization trend observed in many developed countries. Instead, we observe 
the robust trend of upgrading. A similar story is documented for other medium-
income countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where the upskilling has been 
driven by a rapidly growing supply of skilled labor and rapid contraction in agri-
culture (Hardy et al., 2016). What could be behind this in Russia? 
Though multiple factors could be at work here, we consider the structural 
shift from the production of tradable goods to the production of nontradables 
as the main shift. This includes the large-scale downsizing in agriculture and 
manufacturing and the expansion of construction, public sector, trade,  financial 
intermediation, and so on. The case of the agricultural sector is salient. Most 
of the agricultural jobs are low-skilled and poorly paid. During the period of 
2000–2012, agricultural employment shrunk drastically in absolute as well as 
relative terms, thus collapsing the first quintile of employment. Low-skilled 
manufacturing jobs were located in the first quintile, and their decline also con-
tributed to its contraction. 
A more complex answer is needed to explain the expansion on the top. A few 
potential factors could be at work here. 
First, the period under study saw an enormously rapid rise in real earnings, as 
annual growth rates reached 10–15%. On the one hand, this growth was driven by 
general recovery after the prolonged transformational recession when earnings 
lost almost two thirds of their real value. On the other hand, it was triggered by 
world oil prices that benefited Russia. Rising incomes might shift consumption 
towards higher quality goods and services. “Good” jobs in production of nontrad-
ables could emerge as a reaction to this consumption demand shift.
Second, there could be an endogenous supply side effect associated with 
the rapid expansion of tertiary education. According to the Russian Census data, 
during the period of 2002–2010, the fraction of workers with a tertiary-A level 
of education increased from 26% to 36%, and the fraction of workers with a ter-
tiary-B level of education remained stable at the level of 36–37%. Thus, 3 of 
every 4 Russian workers have a tertiary education. It is easy to assume that such 
an increase in the supply of well-educated workers can make them much more 
available for firms and therefore stimulate demand for their labor. As a conse-
quence of this endogenous shift in labor demand, we can see the expansion in 
skilled and well-paid employment. 
Third, the skill-biased technological change (SBTC) could also be at work 
here. The SBTC is a complement to the human capital accumulation and demands 
a highly educated workforce (the modern IT sector is an illustration) (Acemoglu, 
1998; Autor et al., 2003; Card and Di Nardo, 2002). Generating a demand for 
such workers, it stimulates the creation of well-paid jobs. Rapid IT expansion 
in Russia in the 2000s could serve as an argument supporting this explanation. 
However, the fact that the most technologically advanced industries employ 
a small labor force speaks against the SBTC hypothesis.
Finally, job upgrading could be driven by organizational change biased to-
wards highly skilled labor (SBOC). Cross-national differences in technologies 
are among standard powerful predictors of variation in job (and skills) structures. 
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The IT-based economy and the pre-IT-based economy are structurally different 
in this regard. However, different institutional foundations (here, we contrast 
market economies with those that are centrally planned) can also demand dif-
ferent occupations and skills and therefore ultimately affect the economy-wide 
composition of jobs. The Russian development in the 1990s–2000s is a story 
of intertwined movement in both dimensions — the technological as well as 
the institutional. In fact, the SBOC was an important component in the systemic 
plan-to-market transition. This transformation radically increased and modified 
flows of information and created a large and growing demand for workers who 
absorb and process all types of data. These are multiple white-collar occupa-
tions such as managers, lawyers, accountants, journalists, economists, and many 
 others, who are employed in a variety of sectors. The demand for these skills 
was extremely low under the central planning and sharply jumped with the start 
of the transition. The opposite side of the same trend is in falling demand for 
many blue-collar occupations. 
The aforementioned drivers could work (and most likely did) simultaneously, 
complementing each other, and their joint impact resulted in the fast expansion 
of the “good” jobs segment. 
How can the Russian job structure develop in the future? The rate of struc-
tural change decreased in the post-crisis subperiod and is likely to slow down 
 further for a few reasons. First, the long period of depopulation is approaching. 
By 2030, the size of the economically active population is expected to decrease 
by 8–12 million persons. In the 2000s, structural change occurred under condi-
tions of growing total employment; now, it will have to adapt to declining total 
employment. In this new setting of coming depopulation, the scope for further 
expansion of top quintile jobs seems to be more limited. Second, many drivers of 
structural change discussed above are close to exhaustion. Agricultural employ-
ment has already downsized so much that there remains little scope for further 
and easy contraction. Third, the Russian economy is in a deep recession with 
likely prospects of long-term stagnation. This makes a rise in consumption simi-
lar to that observed in the 2000s impossible. The further rapid growth in the sup-
ply of educated labor is also hardly probable because its stock is already ex-
tremely large. Additionally, there are few preconditions for a rapid technological 
spurt. Finally, industrial and occupational employment gradually has become 
more simi lar to those observed in developed countries, and therefore, the room 
for further employment shifts in this direction becomes smaller. 
Deceleration of the upgrading process does not mean that chances for the po-
larization scenario are likely to increase. The polarization hypothesis has emerged 
in relation to countries that are located close to the technological frontier. A hol-
lowing of the middle is driven by advanced technological developments when 
deep automatization and computerization kill effectively medium-quality routine 
jobs. Russia is not that close to this frontier and needs many years to catch up. 
The current economic recession, accompanied by the self-isolation foreign and 
trade policy, is not the most fertile environment for large-scale technological im-
provements along the entire job distribution.
In summary, we can conclude that the upgrading trend is likely to slow down 
if not halt altogether. Whether and when the upgrading trend will be replaced by 
a polarizing trend remains to be seen. 
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Appendix 
The SEO covers large and medium-sized firms only and leaves out some 
cate gories in wage and salary employment (as well as all self-employed). 
The excluded group includes all subcontractors, part-timers, top managers , 
and all those working in small businesses with fewer than 15 employees. 
The survey also does not cover such sectors as Public administration (L), 
Agriculture (A), and Finance (J). Among the advantages of the survey is 
the nature of the earnings information, which is drawn from personnel 
and accounting records instead of simple personal interviewing. This pro-
cedure minimizes measurement errors generated by recall biases, incom-
plete knowledge , deliberate misinformation, and so on. Average earnings 
from the SEO are very close to the official estimates provided by Rosstat. 
In October 2007, the difference  between the SEO-based  average wages and 
the official estimate was less than 3%. 
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Unfortunately, the first SEO was conducted in 2005 only, and comparable es-
timates for earlier years do not exist. However, assuming that earnings-based job 
quality ratings are relatively stable over time, we use data for the year of 2007. 
This time point divides the period under consideration almost by half. First, using 
the same occupation-industry job cells (as we did for the LFS), we rank all jobs 
according to the average monthly wage earned. In the second step, we impute 
these rankings to the LFS-based job cells for 2000, 2008 and 2012. Comparing 
distributions of workers by job types/cells over time, we observe changes in com-
position of employment in terms of job quality measured by earnings.10
As we have already mentioned above, the distribution of workers by job cells 
provided by the SEO is censored because some sectors (A, J, and L) are not 
observed. To remedy this, we reconstruct earnings for missing job types using 
one more external data source, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS), which is the nationally representative panel study of Russian house-
holds free from any industry-occupation censoring.11 The initial RLMS sample 
included approximately 5 thousand households (approximately 12 thousand re-
spondents) from 160 residences in 35 regions. 
The imputation algorithm for earnings in missing cells ( ) is given by 
the simple formula (1), where W stands for wage in job type, SEO and RLMS 
indicate data sources used for calculation of wages, i and j are occupation and 
industry, correspondingly, and cov relates to the mean value averaged for 11 in-
dustries covered by the SEO:
 (A1)
Using this formula, we reconstruct earnings for most of the job cells that are 
missing in the SEO but are present in the LFS. Even after this correction is in-
troduced, some job cells remain empty. However, these tend to be marginal in 
terms of employment (altogether, these cells account for 0.3% of the total employ-
ment), and we can safely exclude them from our analysis without any significant 
loss of information. Additionally, if occupational classifications in the CEO and 
the RLMS deviated from those in the LFS, we aggregated neighboring groups 
and used the higher level of aggregation (for instance, subgroups ISCO-61 and 
ISCO-62 were merged in ISCO-60 — “Skilled agricultural workers”).
 10 In 2007, average earnings varied across occupation/industry cells from 2.3 thousand rubles (ISCO-92/
ISIC-13) to 41.8 thousand (ISCO-13/ISIC-3). 
 11 The RLMS-HSE is conducted by the NRU Higher School of Economics and ZAO “Demoscope” together 
with Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the Institute of Sociology of 
the Russian Academy of Sciences. See more at http://www.hse.ru/en/rlms/.
